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   1 
Dumping: An economic perspective 
 
In imperfectly competitive markets, profit-maximising firms may charge different prices to 
different customers, a practice called price discrimination. The most common form of price 
discrimination in international trade is dumping, a pricing strategy whereby a firm charges a 
lower price for exported products than it does for the same products when they are sold on the 
domestic market. 
 
Dumping can only occur if two conditions are fulfilled. First, the industry must be imperfectly 
competitive, so that firms have market power. That is firms must be able to set prices in the 
domestic or foreign market rather than take prices as given in both markets. Second, markets 
must be segmented, so that domestic customers cannot easily purchase products sold at a 
lower price in foreign markets. 
 
Dumping is considered as an unfair practice in international trade. Economists, however, tend 
to take a more benign view of price discrimination in general, including dumping. As Paul 
Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld state in their popular textbook in International Economics, 
“Economists  have  never  been  very  happy  with  the  idea  of  singling  dumping  out  as  a 
prohibited practice. For one thing, price discrimination between markets may be a perfectly 
legitimate business strategy…Also the legal definition of dumping deviates substantially from 
the economic definition. Since it is often difficult to prove that foreign firms charge higher 
prices to domestic than export customers, [countries] often try to calculate a supposed fair 
price based on estimates of foreign production costs. This “fair price” rule can interfere with 
normal business practices: A firm may well be willing to sell a product for a loss while it is 
lowering its costs through experience or breaking into a new market.”
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Anti-dumping: A political economy perspective 
 
International  economists,  however,  recognise  that  practices  regarded  as  unfair  risk 
undermining a liberal trade regime such as the GATT/WTO and, therefore, that anti-dumping 
and other “fair trade” provisions have a legitimate role to play in the system. Such provisions 
can be viewed as desirable to the extent that they provide “safety valves” to maintain or 
deepen trade liberalisation. At the same time, it is clear that they act exactly in the opposite 
direction if they are captured and misused as protectionist instruments. 
 
Most  economists  would  agree  with  the  statement  that  “[t]he  rise  to  prominence  of 
antidumping  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  logic  of  a  sensible  pressure  valve  instrument.” 
“Antidumping has become the main instrument for dealing with troublesome imports” due to 
its attractive features: (1) particular exporters can be singled out since GATT/WTO rules do 
not require multilateral application; (2) the action is unilateral, with no compensation nor 
renegotiation required by GATT/WTO rules; (3) the injury test for antidumping action tends 
to be softer than the injury test for safeguard action under Article XIX; (4) the rhetoric of 
foreign unfairness provides a vehicle for building a political case for protection; and (5) the 
investigation  process  itself  tends  to curb  imports  because  of  the  administrative  costs  and 
uncertainty borne by traders.
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Addison Wesley: Boston (2006). 
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Finding a balance between competing interests 
 
Given the political necessity of having anti-dumping statutes and the danger of their misuse as 
protectionist  instruments,  the  real  question  is  how  to  devise  rules  that  provide  the  right 
balance between the interests of domestic producers affected by alleged dumping and those 
affected by antidumping measures. There are several possible avenues. 
 
•  The ideal (but probably unrealistic) approach 
 
The ideal solution would be to go back to first principles and recognise that dumping is 
simply  a  form  of  price  discrimination,  which  results  from  imperfect  competition.  The 
traditional  economic  argument  against  anti-dumping  is  simply  that  “[i]t  makes  not  the 
slightest difference to the importing country whether the goods come in cheaply because the 
exporting  country  enjoys  a  natural  comparative  advantage  or  because  they  are  dumped”. 
However, there are two circumstances where dumping can be viewed as detrimental to the 
importing country. The first is when firms in the exporting country are sheltered domestically 
by weak competition policy which allows high domestic prices. In this case competing firms 
in the importing country suffer an unfair disadvantage. The second circumstance is when 
foreign firms practice “predatory or strategic dumping”, setting low export prices in order to 
drive out competitors and then imposing high monopoly prices in the importing country.
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This, economically rigorous line of argument, suggests taking a more competition perspective 
in  anti-dumping  cases,  i.e.  shifting  the  focus  from  protecting  competitors  to  fostering 
competition  in  domestic  and  foreign  markets.  Some  analysts  have  even  suggested  the 
possibility  of  seeking  government  agreement  to  apply  competition  policy-based 
considerations  and  disciplines  in  the  context  of  unfair  trade  allegations  before  turning  to 
standard  antidumping  remedies.  One  proposal  is  that  allegations  of  dumping  first  be 
investigated  by  the  competition  authorities  of  the  importing  and  exporting  country.  A 
necessary  condition  for  imposing  anti-dumping  measures  would  be  a  finding  by  the 
competition authorities that the exporting firm's home market is not open to competition and 
that no remedial action is possible through the application of competition law.
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•  A more realistic approach: Reforming the Community interest clause 
 
Although  involving  competition  authorities  in  anti-dumping  cases  would  make  perfect 
economic sense, it seems totally unrealistic from a political or even a practical viewpoint. 
There is no reason, however, to throw out the baby with the bath water. A highly-desirable 
second-best solution would be for trade authorities in charge of anti-dumping investigations to 
include competition considerations in their assessment of the Community interest. This would 
not require the involvement of competition authorities or necessarily sophisticated economic 
analysis. Even fairly simple economic analysis would, however, help getting rid of obvious 
cases like Footwear,
5 where the size and number of producers and exporters clearly indicate 
                                                
3 Preventing predatory dumping is one of only four exceptions to free trade considered as legitimate by Keynes. 
The  other  three  are:  achieving  non-economic  objectives;  ensuring  against  excessive  dependence  on  other 
countries in key industries; and promoting infant industries. See Douglas Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual 
History of Free Trade, Princeton University Press: Princeton (1996). 
4 Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis, “Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust”, Journal of World Trade 
(1996). 
5 Footwear with uppers of leather (China, Vietnam), 2006 OJ L 98, 6 April 2006, p. 3. 
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that the first condition for economic dumping, i.e. market power, is not fulfilled. The key here 
is the willingness to apply economic reasoning to anti-dumping investigation.  
 
More generally, the Community interest clause and its implementation could be improved. 
Their deficiency is demonstrated by the fact that the current Community interest test under 
Article 21 of the EC Anti-Dumping Regulation is hardly ever used to reject anti-dumping 
measures in cases where dumping and injury have been established. On the contrary, the 
Community interest clause is typically used to reinforce the case in favour of anti-dumping 
measures.
6  
 
Even more problematic is the fact that the Community interest can only be invoked after, 
rather than during, the determination of dumping. Again, in  the  Footwear case, dumping 
would not have been found had the Community interest test included an economic assessment 
of market power taken into account during the determination of dumping. 
 
The current rules imply that, with only very few exceptions, the Community authorities have 
tended to equate the various interests of the Community with those of the complainants. This 
may be surprising, in particular in light of the fact that the Commission has, in recent years, 
experienced  increasing  difficulties  in  imposing  anti-dumping  duties  because  of  persistent 
pressure from domestic users, consumers etc. which alleged that they would be adversely 
affected  by  the  imposition  of  anti-dumping  duties.  In  fact,  the  effects  of  an  increasing 
globalisation and, in particular, the European companies’ increasing share of manufacturing 
ventures  in  the  developing  world  have  rendered  it  more  and  more  difficult  for  the 
Commission to asses and balance the various (opposed) interests of the Community. After all, 
modern manufacturing involves use of components, which are nowadays often produced in 
emerging economies that are precisely the target of most Community anti-dumping actions.
7    
 
The  current  Community  interest  test  no  longer  adequately  reflects  the  reality  of  today’s 
globalised business environment and should therefore be modified. Besides the introduction 
of simple competition considerations, two directions can be envisaged. 
 
First,  the  interest  of  users  or  consumers  should  be  given  greater  weight  in  the 
determination of the Community interest. In principle the Commission attempts to 
weigh the interests of the various parties involved, mainly those of the complaining 
Community industry and those of the users or consumers. However, in practice the 
interests of the former are far better taken into account than those of the latter. The 
reason is that, typically, the number of producers in the Community industry is much 
smaller than the number of users or consumers. Therefore, it is much easier for the 
producers to organise and launch a complaint than it is for the users or the consumers 
to state their case. Moreover, the Commission tends to present the total cost of the 
effect of dumping on the Community industry (for instance by stating the total number 
of  people  it  employs),  whereas it  only  presents  the cost  of  the  effect  of  the  anti-
                                                
6 This fact, which can be observed by reading the Commission regulations imposing anti-dumping measures 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union, has been analysed systematically in the economics 
literature. See, for instance, Xiang Liu and Hylke Vandenbussche, “EU Antidumping Cases Against China”, 
Journal  of  World  Trade  (2001)  and  Kommerskollegium,  “Treatment  of  the  ‘Community  Interest’  in  EU 
Antidumping Investigations”, National Board of Trade: Stockholm (2005). 
7 During the period from 1/1/1995 to 31/12/2005, the EC initiated 327 anti-dumping proceedings, of which 
nearly all were against imports from emerging countries, including: China (60 cases), India (27), Korea (25), 
Taiwan (19), Russia (16), Thailand (15), Malaysia (13), Indonesia (12) and Poland (10). By contrast, there were 
only 8 cases against Japan and 9 against the United States.     4 
dumping measure per user or consumer. No wonder that users and consumers rarely 
respond to the invitation to make themselves known and provide information to the 
Commission, especially since the time limit for responding is extremely short. The 
result is that the Commission typically finds that cost of the effect of dumping on the 
Community industry is “significant”, whereas the cost of the effect of anti-dumping 
measures on users or consumers is “not significant”.  
 
A  more  thorough  evaluation  of  the  Community  interest  would  require  that  the 
Commission employs some of its own resources to identify the users and assess the 
cost  of  anti-dumping  measures  for  them  on exactly  the  same  dimension  as  in  the 
analysis of injury to import-competing domestic producers specified in Article 3(5) of 
the  basic  Regulation,  namely  actual  and  potential  decline  in  sales,  profits, 
employment, and so on.     
   
Second, the Community interest clause could be made more flexible. Under the current 
rules,  the  Commission  merely  has  to  investigate  whether  it  is  in  the  Community 
interest to apply certain measures. Pursuant to the basic Regulation, if the measures 
are not in the Community interest, the Commission must refrain from imposing them. 
The  Commission  should  not  only  have  to  assess  whether  it  is  in  the  Community 
interest  to  adopt  anti-dumping  duties.  If  the  answer  is  positive,  it  should  also  be 
required to evaluate whether the Community interest calls for specific modalities of 
those anti-dumping measures or, in analogy to the lesser duty rule, for the imposition 
of lower duties.  
 
Such more extensive approach to the Community interest would, to a certain extent, 
endorse  and  reinforce  the  Commission’s  current  practice.  Indeed,  de  facto,  the 
Community  institutions have already started to apply a more flexible approach  by 
using unconventional modalities in reaction to the increasing pressure from adversely 
affected domestic parties during anti-dumping proceedings. This could, for instance, 
be  observed  in  the  Castings  case,
8  where  the  Commission  has,  against  its  long-
standing practice, accepted undertakings from companies that were not granted Market 
Economy Status or Individual Treatment. Similarly, in the Footwear case, domestic 
producers  on  the  one  hand  and  European  companies  with  stakes  in  the  exporting 
countries  on  the  other  hand  were  bitterly  opposed.  This  eventually  forced  the 
Commission to compromise by adopting highly unconventional measures in form of 
gradually  increasing  provisional  duties.  Likewise,  there  is  fierce  resistance  from 
Community operators in the ongoing Plastic sacks and bags case and the Commission 
will,  again,  be  facing  the  difficult  task  of  balancing  the  different  stakeholders’ 
interests.  
 
Explicitly  requiring  the  Commission  to  consider  the  Community  interest  when 
assessing what kind of modalities/duty rates would best fit the differing interests of the 
domestic industry, users, consumers etc., would moreover significantly increase the 
influence of these stakeholders in the Commission’s decision-making. This would, in 
turn, lead to the imposition of more balanced and equitable anti-dumping measures 
and  would  give  the  Commission  more  flexibility  in  adapting  its  measures  to  the 
respective needs of the various interested parties.   
 
                                                
8   Castings (China), OJ L 199, 29 July 2005, p. 1, as amended by Council Regulation 268/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 47) 
p. 3.   5 
A  broader  application  of  the  Community  Interest  test  would  imply  that  the 
Commission always has to assess whether a less restrictive measure is more in the 
Community interest than a more restrictive one. 
 
Obviously, these two directions are not mutually exclusive.  
 
•  Another avenue: Increasing transparency 
 
It is essential to ensure transparency of anti-dumping proceedings and measures not only in 
the Community but also elsewhere.  
 
First, with respect to anti-dumping proceedings, a basic requirement with which the 
Commission should comply is that all interested parties be timely informed of any 
proposed finding made by the Commission services and allowed to comment.  In this 
connection, a fundamental deficiency of the current procedural system is that prior 
disclosure  of  proposed  findings  is  only  given  with  respect  to  proposed  definitive 
determinations. As regards provisional determinations, disclosure is only given after 
the imposition of provisional measures.   
 
Obviously, in order to allow parties to effectively defend their interests, disclosure 
should  take  place  prior  to  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures.  Such  early 
disclosure  would  ensure  that  the  Commission  can  take  into  account  any 
representations from the parties at the time it adopts its preliminary decision.  
 
Disclosure prior to the imposition of measures would not only give interested parties 
an opportunity to reiterate and/or further specify their position in the ongoing anti-
dumping proceeding but would also enable them to point out manifest errors in the 
Commission’s assessment whenever such errors have occurred.  
 
The disclosure of the details underlying the essential facts and considerations on which 
the Commission bases its final findings in an anti-dumping proceeding already takes 
place prior to the imposition of definitive duties in accordance with Article 20(4) of 
the EC Anti-Dumping Regulation. This means that parties can defend their interests by 
submitting disclosure comments in case a definitive duty is to be imposed, whereas 
they are denied such an opportunity where the imposition of provisional measures is 
being  discussed.  Given  that  provisional  measures  may  have  similarly  far-reaching 
consequences for economic operators as definitive duties, disclosure should in both 
cases take place prior to the adoption of anti-dumping duties.   
 
Accordingly,  the  provisions  under  Article  20  of  the  EC  Anti-Dumping  Regulation 
should be amended to ensure that interested parties can submit disclosure comments at 
an early stage, which would allow them to more efficiently defend their interests in 
anti-dumping proceedings.
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The lack of transparency in anti-dumping proceedings is by no means a monopoly of 
the Community authorities. As the Delegation of the European Commission to the 
WTO recently stated in a communication to the Rules Negotiating Group: “Over the 
past decade, there has been an upsurge in the number of Members which resort to the 
                                                
9 This line of argument has been most forcefully articulated by Jean-François Bellis, my Law School colleague.   6 
anti-dumping  (AD)  instrument.  Often,  such  increase  in  AD  activity  is  not 
accompanied by sufficient transparency with regard to the procedures and practices 
followed…This  situation  jeopardises  the  overall  credibility  of  the  AD  instrument” 
(emphasis  added).
10  The  solution  proposed  by  the  EC  is  to  entrust  the  WTO 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices to conduct a periodic factual review of each 
member’s anti-dumping policies and practices. This would certainly be useful.   
 
Second,  with  respect  to  anti-dumping  measures,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  get  a 
comprehensive overview of the anti-dumping measures currently in force not only in 
the Community but also elsewhere. As at 30 June 2005, there were 167 measures 
(definitive duties and price undertakings) in force in the EC and over 1,000 measures 
in force elsewhere,
11 of which roughly 150 affected EC exporters.
12  
 
In a recent communication to the Rules Negotiating Group, the Delegation of Hong 
Kong, China has proposed to enhance transparency of anti-dumping measures to the 
benefit of traders and the general public by adding a new paragraph to Article 12 of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement introducing the requirement for each WTO member to 
maintain a public register of all definitive measures currently in force. The register 
would contain detailed information for each of the anti-dumping measure in force, 
including: the size of the domestic industry; the volume or value of import affected; 
and the amount of anti-dumping duty collected.
13 The EC should support this proposal. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In  spite  of  almost  universal  disapproval  by  economists  anti-dumping  cases  have  grown 
significantly in recent decades. As Krugman and Obstfeld note “Most economists consider 
these kinds of “antidumping” cases to have little to do with dumping in the economic sense.” 
Indeed the rise of anti-dumping is more related to the desire to protect firms from foreign 
competition than to foster competition and competitiveness in the age of globalisation. 
 
This  paper  has  sought  to  provide  some  ideas  for  adapting  the  Community  anti-dumping 
instrument to the new economic reality. Two lines of reform have been suggested. The first 
consists of improving the Community interest clause in two directions: by improving the 
economic analysis on one hand, and by introducing more procedural flexibility on the other. 
The second reform consists of introducing greater transparency with respect to both anti-
dumping proceedings and measures.   
                                                
10  Transparency  of  the  Anti-Dumping  Activity,  Submission  from  the  European  Communities,  WTO, 
TN/RL/GEN/110, 20 April 2006. 
11 Report (2005) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, WTO, G/L/758, 2 November 2005. 
12 The total number of anti-dumping measures imposed by WTO members during the period from 1 January 
1995 to 31 December 2005 is 1804: 316 by the EC and 1498 by other members. Of these 1498 measures, 219 
(i.e. 15%) affected EC exports. 
13 Additional Proposal on Transparency under Article 12 of the ADA, Paper from Hong Kong, China, WTO, 
TN/RL/GEN/83/Add.1, 24 April 2006. 